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Abstract The paper discusses the problem of self-sacrifice as posed by Derrida in
Foi et Savior and by Schiller in the Theosophie des Julius. Whereas Derrida under-
stands self-sacrifice as an act of violence against oneself in order not to subject others
to violence, Schiller rightly insists that one must distinguish between egotistical and
altruistic self-sacrifice. But even this doesn’t go far enough: Altruistic self-sacrifice
is different from suffering death as the consequence of an entirely unselfish love.
Whoever loses his life out of love does not give it up for others, whether selfishly
or unselfishly. He loves the other—to death. Such a death is not a (self-)sacrifice. It
results from a passion of love, not an act of violence against oneself.
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The ambivalence of self-sacrifice
The threefold paradox of sacrifice
“Is a religion imaginable without sacrifice and without prayer?” Derrida asks in “Foi et
Savior,”1 and he answers this question in his usual paradoxical manner.2 Since religion
demands both—an absolute “respect of life” and a universal willingness to sacrifice or
“sacrificial vocation”3— it “both requires and excludes sacrifice.”4 In order to retain
the inviolability of life, life must be violated. And in order not to need sacrifice any
longer, one must perform sacrifice. Only in “the sacrifice of the sacrifice,” so Derrida,
does religion come into its own. The conditions of its possibility are at the same time
the conditions of its impossibility.
This paradox of sacrifice manifests itself in three concrete respects. On the one
hand, sacrifice is according to Derrida, “the price to pay for not injuring or wronging
the absolute other.”5 On the other hand, the use of violence “in the name of non-
violence” is preposterous.6 This is the first paradox of sacrifice: one must use violence
in the name of non-violence in order to avoid doing violence to the non-violent other.
But there is more to it. Even if the violence of sacrifice is unavoidable in order
not to violate the absolute other, it is unacceptable to subject other life to this kind of
violence. “Absolute respect” therefore “enjoins first and foremost sacrifice of self,”
namely giving up “one’s most precious interest”: one’s own life. Only those who sac-
rifice themselves are truly sacrificing. “Self-sacrifice thus sacrifices the most proper
1 Derrida (1996, 1998), pp. 1–78, 52.
2 Derrida’s remarks on (self-)sacrifice in “Foi et Savoir”/”Faith and Knowledge” must be understood in the
context of his other writings on giving, gift, and sacrifice at the time, in particular Derrida (1991, 1992a,b,
1995). Considering the so-called ‘return of the gods’ and in view of the ambiguity of religions, which
manifest the worst and the best in humankind, Derrida asks whether there is a future for religion and if so, in
what form. In order to answer this question he asks, from a hermeneutical point of view, what the question
is to which religion is the answer. His answer refers to two sources of ‘religion’, faith and knowledge, both
of which are ambiguous. Thus, faith or lived religion appears to be both a reaction to violence and based
on violence. There is no religion without sacrifice, but sacrifice is deeply paradoxical. Since in sacrificing
religions use violence to overcome violence, they can overcome violence only by using violence against
themselves, i.e. by sacrificing themselves. This amounts to saying that the future of religion is to make
religion superfluous, which can only be achieved by overcoming the violence to which religions react by
sacrificing by sacrificing religion itself.
3 Ibid. p. 50.
4 Ibid. p. 52.
5 This decisive premise of Derrida’s argument is assumed without being argued for.
6 This criticism is old and often repeated. Cf. Herakleitos DK 22 B 5 (Aristocritus Theosophia 681): “They
vainly purify themselves by defiling themselves with blood, just as if one who had stepped into the mud were
to wash his feet in mud. And they pray to these images, as if one were to talk with a man’s house, knowing
not what gods or heroes are.” Montaigne (1962, p. 502) restates the argument in a Christian context by
pointing out that a corrupted creation cannot be corrected by sacrifices which are themselves a corruption of
creation. And Nietzsche (The Antichrist, 41) uses it as the most obvious self-contradiction of the Christian
gospel: “God gave his son as a sacrifice for the forgiveness of sins. At once there was an end of the gospels!
Sacrifice for sin, and in its most obnoxious and barbarous form: sacrifice of the innocent for the sins of the
guilty! What appalling paganism!”
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in the service of the most proper.” This is the second paradox of sacrifice: one must
use violence against oneself in order not to subject others to violence.
But yet a third point follows. Whoever sacrifices him or herself, has sacrificed once
and for all. His sacrifice becomes—for him! —“the sacrifice of sacrifice.” This is, if
at all, the only “pure” sacrifice—and it is at the same time the exposure of its funda-
mental ambiguity: to demand what is strictly excluded is to demand self-annihilation
in order to preserve the inviolability of the other. Whoever does not sacrifice himself
does violence to the other and whoever sacrifices himself avoids doing violence to
others by doing violence to himself. This is the third paradox of sacrifice: by sacri-
ficing oneself, the sacrifice is abolished. Others need not fear from me any further
violence, the avoidance of which would give occasion for sacrifice. Self-sacrifice ends
the occasion and necessity of sacrifice: it is the end of sacrifice.
Derrida hence grounds sacrifice within self-sacrifice and proves this to be paradox-
ical. His (implicit) argument unfolds in three steps: (1) from the supposed necessity
of sacrifice as a means of avoiding violence against the other to (2) the unavoidability
of self-sacrifice and at the same time, the impossibility of avoiding violence against
oneself to (3) the abolition or “Aufhebung” of sacrifice in self-sacrifice, which does
away with the need for sacrifice by bringing about the needlessness of sacrifice in that
violence against oneself excludes and ends violence against others.
The basis of this entire argument rests on situating the theme of sacrifice in the
paradigm of violence: it is always a question of avoiding violence against the Other
through violence either against others (sacrifice) or against oneself (self-sacrifice).
That sacrifice could also be something other than acts of violence is never considered.
This constitutes the fundamental weakness of the analysis: it reduces sacrifice to the
act of a violent killing. However, the majority of sacrifices in religions are not blood
sacrifices but food-offerings, and in blood sacrifices killing is the least important fea-
ture of the symbolical universe of the sacrifice and does not stand at its center. For
example, the symbolic action of the expiatory sacrifice in ancient Israel is carried out
as a consecration (i.e. the identification of the master of the sacrifice with the sacri-
ficial animal, which then becomes a symbol for the master of the sacrifice) and as an
incorporation into the holy (which “through the offering of the blood of the sacrificial
animal” effects “the symbolic giving of the life of the master of the sacrifice”),7 while
the killing of the sacrificial animal plays only a subordinate role in the procurement of
blood for effecting the symbolic incorporation. The religious element that matters here
is not the act of killing but, on the one hand, the transfer of identity in the consecration
and, on the other, the symbolic incorporation into the holy of the sacrificer through
the offering of the blood of the sacrificial animal.8
But even within Derrida’s myopic view, a key point retains a significant ambiva-
lence: Does self-sacrifice that “sacrifices the most proper in the service of the most
proper” sacrifice the most proper in the service of one’s own self or in the service of
the other? Or does this difference play no role because both converge in self-sacrifice
towards the avoidance of violence against others? Since Derrida leaves this in the dark,
7 Gese (1977, pp. 85–106, 98).
8 Cf. Dalferth (1994b, pp. 237–315).
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his argument exposes a weak spot at its most important juncture: it is blind against the
difference between egotistical and altruistic self-sacrifice, between self-sacrifice in
the service of one’s own well-being and self-sacrifice in the service of the well-being
of others.
Both may be described as the end of sacrifice, but only the latter and not the former
gives occasion for speaking of an act of love. However, to understand the phenome-
non under consideration as an act of love, “explodes” (in Blumenberg’s sense9) the
reductive paradigm of violence and opens up a new and different perspective. To put
it succinctly, and this is the thesis for which I shall argue: If the altruistic loss of one’s
own life for the sake of the other is an avoidable act of violence against oneself—that
is, an act of violence that one commits against oneself without having necessarily
had to commit it—then it is a self-sacrifice, but not an act of love. Is it, on the other
hand, an act of love, then one’s own avoidable death—that is, the death that one could
have avoided—is no act of violence against oneself and as such no self-sacrifice but
the result of a passion of unselfish love that will allow nothing, not even one’s own
impending death, to stop it to live its love of others indeed for the sake of others
rather than for one’s own sake. The decisive difference is not between sacrifice and
self-sacrifice, but between egotistic and altruistic self-sacrifice, on the one hand, and
between an act of violence and an act of love on the other. For only the difference
between egotistic and altruistic self-sacrifice opens the perspective for understanding
the avoidable loss of one’s own life for the sake of others not in the paradigm of vio-
lence, but in the paradigm of love; however, to understand it as an act of love it is to
understand it not as an act of violence and hence not even as altruistic self-sacrifice
but in a different category altogether. For love exists only where love is lived and prac-
ticed, and the practice of love overcomes both sacrifice and self-sacrifice by reacting
to violence not by violence but by non-violent love even at the cost of loosing one’s
life. To show this, I shall first argue for the need to distinguish between egotistic and
altruistic self-sacrifice, and then for understanding the avoidable loss of one’s own life
for the sake of others not as an act of violence against oneself but as an act of love for
the other.
Egotistical and altruistic self-sacrifice
One of the most compelling expositions of the difference between egotistic and altru-
istic self-sacrifice can be found in Schiller’s Theosophie des Julius in which pre-
cisely this difference is identified as the crucial point in the problematic of sacrifice.10
Schiller’s argument does not, however, begin with the sacrifice but with the reality of
love. As Julius, Schiller’s alter ego, impresses upon his friend Raphael: “I admit it
9 Cf. H. Blumenberg’s term “Sprengmetaphorik” in Blumenberg (1960, pp. 7–142): “What we would
call ‘explosive metaphorics’… draws concretization into a process, in which it it at first able to follow
along (e.g., conceiving a circle’s radius doubled and ever further increased), but finally reaches a point
(e.g., conceiving the greatest possible, that is, infinite, radius of a circle) where it has to give up—and this
is understood as ‘giving itself up’ as well.” (132, translation)
10 Fr. Schiller (1975, pp.344–358).
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frankly; I believe in the reality of a non-selfish love.”11 “But love has brought forth
effects which seem to contradict its nature. It is conceivable that I increase my own
happiness through a sacrifice, which I offer for the happiness of others—but is that
also the case when this sacrifice is my own life?… How is it possible that we could
regard our own death as a means to increase the sum of our pleasure? How can the
termination of my existence agree with the enrichment of my being?”12 What appears
conceivable with sacrifice becomes paradoxical with self-sacrifice: the one for whom
it could and should bring an improvement of life no longer lives.
A possible answer may be found in the reference to immortality: “The assump-
tion of an immortality lifts this contradiction.”13 But Julius sees correctly that love
is thereby also lifted. “Consideration for a rewarding future excludes love.”14 “It is
indeed ennobling to the human soul to sacrifice the present advantages for the eternal—
it is the noblest degree of egoism—but egoism and love separate humankind into two
highly dissimilar races, whose boundaries never flow into one another. Egoism erects
its center in itself; love plants it outside of itself in the axis of the eternal whole. Love
aims at unity, egoism at solitude. Love is the co-governing citizen of a blossoming
free state, egoism a despot in a ravaged creation. Egoism sows for gratitude, love for
ingratitude. Love gives away, egoism lends out—no matter before the throne of the
judging truth whether this is done for the enjoyment of the next-following moment,
or with the prospect of a martyr’s crown—no matter, whether the interest is achieved
in this life or in the other!”15
Hence an egotism nurtured by the hope for immortality is also the opposite of love.
The question raised must therefore be answered another way: “Imagine a truth, my
Raphael, that does all humankind good for distant centuries to come—add to this that
this truth condemns the one who professes it to death, that this truth can only be proven,
can only be believed if the one who professes it dies.”16 Then imagine a man who
wants to realize this very truth: “does this man need the directive of a future life?”17
The answer, which Julius suggests, is clearly no. Only he who acts in this way does
not act egotistically when he sacrifices himself.
Schiller thus distinguishes between an egotistical self-sacrifice, which is carried out
in hope of an eternal remuneration18 and an altruistic self-sacrifice, which is carried
out for the sake of others—of all others and therefore for the sake of the whole of
humankind—and which alone deserves to be called a sacrifice of love. Only the latter
is a “virtue … which can do without a belief in immortality, which effects the sacrifice
11 Ibid. p. 351.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid. pp. 351–352.
16 Ibid. 352.
17 Ibid.
18 Cf. the explanation of early Christian martyrdom in terms of rational choice theory in Starke (1996);
Janowski (2007), 9ff.
123
82 Int J Philos Relig (2010) 68:77–94
in question even at the risk of annihilation.”19 Only someone who sacrifices him or
herself solely for the sake others—all others!—acts truly out of unselfish love.
Altruistic self-sacrifice in Schiller’s sense of unselfish love therefore distinguishes
itself in two ways. On the one hand, it is not motivated by an attitude of egotistical
value maximization beyond the boundary of death: it is fundamentally altruistic, not
egotistic. On the other hand, it is not restricted, particular or abstract, but unrestricted,
universal and concrete. It is based neither in family relations, which privilege genetic
closeness i.e. blood or kinship ties and thus do not include all20; nor is it based in
friendship bonds, which do not exist without local proximity or personal acquaintance
and which are therefore also restricted21; nor is it based in an abstract moral maxim
that one must under certain circumstances sacrifice oneself for all those who fall under
a specific rule. Unconditional, unselfish and thus universally inclusive is but a concrete
form of neighbor love, which is not a version of the rule of sagacity, to do unto others
what one expects from others or (in its negative form) not to do unto others as you
would not do unto yourself. In this case one would treat others as a neighbor because
one expects the same from them. Concrete neighbor love is precisely not attached to
that kind of expectation but sees and treats the other also as a neighbor when those
expectations are unrealistic or thwarted. It is not founded in the reciprocity of the like
for like but in the experience of having become God’s freely chosen neighbor without
having a right or entitlement to it; and since God also relates to all others as his freely
chosen neighbors, one can rely on God in every situation, for people do not choose
God but God chooses people. Without this a question of choice on their part could not
even arise. Everyone therefore has a right to be seen and treated as God’s neighbor
just as much as oneself. Seen in this light, neighbor love becomes a reorientation of
a human life by the insight into the prior love of God. It does not result from a moral
self-determination of one’s own conduct towards others, but rather manifests the fact
that one has become the neighbor of the one who has made all other people to his
neighbors as well so that everyone under all circumstances and without exception is
to be seen and to be treated as God’s neighbor.
However, if altruistic self-sacrifice is understood from this perspective, then one
cannot stop with Schiller either. If neighbor love leads to death, then this is not a
substitutional self-sacrifice by which someone goes to his or her death in the place of
another in order to save him or her or avoid this other person’s death; on the contrary,
19 Ibid. p. 351.
20 In this sense the pelican which provides her own blood to her young when no other food is available
became a symbol of self-sacrificing love in medieval Europe.
21 Jonas (1979, p. 5) criticizes traditional moral maxims such as principle of Christian neighbor love “Love
thy neighbor as thyself” or the Golden Rule “Do unto others as you would wish them to do unto you”
because “in all these maxims the agent and the ‘other’ of his action are sharers of a common present…. The
ethical universe is composed of contemporaries, and its horizon to the future is confined by the foreseeable
span of their lives.” (5) This he believes to be utterly insufficient in view of the ecological crisis that faces
humanity today. In order to cope with today’s challenges we need to change from neighbor love to the love
of the most distant ones as expressed in the ecological imperative: “‘Act so that the effects of your action are
compatible with the permanence of genuine human life’; or expressed negatively: ‘Act so that the effects
of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such life”’ (11). But it is a mistake to think
neighbor love to be restricted to contemporaries and contrast it to the love of distant ones or of enemies.
Rightly understood it includes those and is not opposed to them.
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it is a question of stepping in for another at the cost of one’s own self-preservation, of
being present to the other in her needs even at the cost of one’s own life. Furthermore,
such a death is not a sacrifice due to pity or compassion, in which one gives up one’s
own life in solidarity with the suffering of another, but rather an expression of unfailing
neighbor love that is lived unto death. Something is done for others (and not in place
of others or in solidarity with others) which leads to the loss of one’s own life; and it
is not only done for them, but would be done for all others in a similar situation in a
similar fashion because not doing so would be incompatible with how one is supposed
to conduct oneself towards those who are God’s freely chosen neighbors. In such a
case it is a question of living and dying for the sake of others and for others. One does
not intentionally seek out one’s own death even if it leads to it but accepts even death
because anything else would stand in a fundamental contradiction to the orientation of
one’s own life in terms of love and hence amount to an existential self-contradiction:
whoever dies out of neighbor love does not kill oneself but rather loves the one whom
God loves, even if it results in losing one’s life.
To sum up; for Derrida, the paradox in the basic structure of sacrifice is most obvious
in the phenomenon of self-sacrifice. According to Schiller, this needs to be differen-
tiated: as an act of violence against oneself (egotistical self-sacrifice) or as an act of
love (altruistic self-sacrifice). To distinguish between these two kinds of sacrifice is
correct and important but does not go far enough. As soon as one understands altruistic
self-sacrifice as an act of love, then an idea is introduced that breaks the paradigm of
sacrifice apart and involves a shift to a different frame of thought for understanding the
phenomenon in question: a death resulting from unconditional, unselfish love does not
have to be self-sacrifice; it can also be the consequence of a passion of unremitting love.
Altruistic self-sacrifice and unselfish love
Self-sacrifice is a certain kind of sacrifice—namely its paradoxical limit case: one
doesn’t give up another but one’s own life. This renunciation of life can result from
egotistical or altruistic motives. However, and this is what Schiller makes clear, a
self-giving of one’s life is not a means of securing one’s self-preservation across the
boundary of death. Moreover, whoever gives one’s own life for the profit of others
uses it as a means to an end and therefore remains caught in the paradigm of egotis-
tical self-sacrifice by using one’s own life as a means to reach an extrinsic goal. By
surrendering one’s own life as a means to an end, one chooses death, but in doing so
one stays master of one’s own self insofar as one chooses for oneself one’s own death
and sees its meaning precisely in this self-made decision. Surrendering one’s life for
the sake of others can thus be a subtle expression of an egotistical attitude towards life,
which subjects even one’s own suffering and death to one’s own power of action and
one’s own endowment of something with meaning: one gives oneself death in order to
be the one who gives one’s own death an altruistic meaning. Even in death one is thus
still the master of one’s own life. The sacrifice of one’s own life becomes a vehicle to
reach an extrinsic end.
Death as a result of unconditional, unselfish love is something else. In this case
one gives up neither another nor one’s own life, but nothing at all: one suffers death
(and does not give oneself death) in loving advocacy for others. One’s own death is
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in this sense not a gift to anyone, not an act of violence against oneself and therefore
not a sacrifice in the sense outlined: one does not give up on life but lives it in such
a way that it exhausts itself in the love of others. One loves so unconditionally and
so unrestrictedly that even one’s own self-preservation does not present itself as an
obstacle or limit to this love. It is thus not self-sacrifice and as such sacrifice itself,
but neighbor love and as such love itself, which constitutes the horizon in which the
sense of one’s own death is disclosed.
Hence death as a result of neighbor love is distinct from altruistic self-sacrifice in
that it is not an act of violence against oneself but a suffering of the consequences of an
entirely unselfish love. Such a death is no sacrifice in that one gives up something or
even one’s own life in order to reach an external goal or avoid a consequence. Acts of
unselfish love are carried out without a ‘because’ or a ‘why.’ They orient themselves
entirely along others and use one’s own life not even as a means. Their point is to do
something completely out of love for others even if one loses one’s life in the pro-
cess. When Maximilian Kolbe voluntarily took the place of Franciszek Gajowniczek
in Auschwitz-Birkenau, it would be a mistake to think that he sacrificed himself by
using his life as a means to save others; rather, he acted out of neighbor love in such a
way that he accepted death, because practicing unconditional love was a higher goal
for him than saving his own life. His death was not the end or means of his love but its
consequence. In practicing love he was not concerned about his own death but about
the life of the other; and since an action is defined by the intention or motive that
governs it, what he did was not an act of self-sacrifice but of unrestricted love.
In cases such as these, one’s own death is neither the end nor a means of what one
does, but is rather taken as an unavoidable collateral damage, so to speak, in abiding
under all circumstances by the love of one’s neighbor. It would not be an unrestricted,
unselfish love if one were dissuaded by one’s own impending death. Whoever loses
her life in acting for the other does not commit an act of violence against herself, but
suffers death as a result of unconditional neighbor love.
This is why such acts are not sacrifices. Where life is lost out of love, sacrifice
ends. No one is giving anything to anybody, whether the life of others or one’s own
life, in order to reach a goal. If others reach or receive anything by it, then it is not
in any intentional sense given to them by the one who lost his (or her) life, even if
they do not—or could not—reach that goal without this person’s death. Understood
in this sense, ‘sacrifices of love’ are not sacrifices but acts of love. As acts of love they
are directed towards the other, but they do not intend the death of the one who loves,
in particular not as a means to an end. Rather, if the loving one suffers death, then
because he (or she) cannot be dissuaded from living one’s life for the love of others.
The death of the one who loves is not the end or a means of his or her action but a
consequence of living a life that is exclusively and totally oriented and informed by
the well-being of the other.
The passion of love
For precisely this reason, one must hold against Derrida, a religion can neither expect
nor exclude the willingness to die for love. Loss of life out of unselfish love also reaches
123
Int J Philos Relig (2010) 68:77–94 85
beyond Schiller’s altruistic self-sacrifice. It is not an act of violence, neither against
oneself nor against others. It is not an act of any kind that the one who dies would carry
out in order to end his (or her) life; it is, rather, the suffered loss of life—and not the
sought or intended loss—be it in the conscious risk of one’s life for others, be it with
factual consequences for others that may not even have been intended. Loss of life out
of love does not constitute a gift for others in that it results from an intentional activity.
Whoever loses his life out of love does not give it up for others, whether selfishly or
unselfishly. He loves the other—to death. But the motive and goal of his love is life,
not death, and that his love leads to death is not the result of an act of violence against
himself but a consequence of the actual situation in which he practices his love, which
makes his love suffer and turns it into passion.
The decisive difference between sacrifice and self-sacrifice is therefore not that
sacrifice relinquishes another’s life while self-sacrifice relinquishes one’s own: in the
case of the former, the identity of the master of the sacrifice is symbolically trans-
ferred to the sacrificial animal, which suffers death in place of the sacrificer in order
to retain his life; by contrast, self-sacrifice involves giving up one’s own life in order
to retain the lives of others. The crucial point is rather that one’s own death becomes
an expression and execution of unselfish love only when it is no longer the limit case
of sacrifice in which not someone else’s life but one’s own life is sacrificed, but where
nothing, not even one’s own suffering or impending death keeps someone from pursu-
ing relentlessly what is good for others. When acts of love lead to one’s own suffering
or death, then one has not actively aspired to this but rather suffers it as a passion of
love, which under no circumstances and on no condition gives up on its commitment
to others.
It is not self-evident that such an unselfish love exists—a love that does not let itself
be kept from living for the sake of others, be it for the price of one’s own suffering
and death. The reality of such a love, in human life as much as with respect to God,
had to be discovered in religions through a long and complicated process. Biblical
tradition documents this impressively, especially where it shows, within the very par-
adigm of sacrifice, the change from understanding something as an act of violence to
understanding it as an act of love. It thereby makes the discovery that sacrifice has
no future, but an end: the crucial insight about sacrifice is not that it is religiously
necessary, even if impossible to realize, but that it is possible, but no longer necessary.
One can sacrifice, even oneself, but one does not need to because what one is trying
to accomplish cannot be reached through sacrifice and has long since been reached
through the reality of unselfish love.
Important strands in the Biblical tradition substantiate this transition from the par-
adigm of sacrifice to the paradigm of a completely different form of life and thought,
most impressively the stories of Abraham’s trial and Jesus’ crucifixion. The former
demonstrates that God’s promises are infallibly trustworthy; the latter, that God’s
power does not reside in violence but in love.22 Taken together they prove through
22 This changes the meaning and point of the notion of divine power from a first order predicate or attribute
of God to a second order predicate or attribute of the nature of God, i.e. of divine love: The meaning of
God’s power is misconstrued if understood as mere divine omnipotence rather than as the omnipotence of
divine love.
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exemplary stories of real-life experiments that God is love—a love that does not want
sacrifice but a life lived in unconditional commitment to others.
Abraham’s experiment with God: the discovery of God’s trustworthiness
The story of Abraham’s trial in Gen 22 is found in the cycle of Abraham narratives
that stretch from Gen 11:27 through Gen 22 to the account of Abraham’s death in
Gen 25.23 This cycle has its central theological motive in God’s twofold promise of
the land and of blessing Abraham’s name and making him the father of a great nation
(Gen. 12: 1–3). The fact that these promises are emphasized in this way indicates how
seriously they had been put into question in Israel’s experience of exile since 587/586,
the most probable time of the origin of this cycle.
Abraham’s silence: the ambivalence of God
If we read Gen 22 not in isolation but as part of the cycle of Abraham narratives as
it has been handed down, then it does not deal with a drama between Abraham and
Isaac, but between Israel, for whom Abraham functions as the progenitor, and God.24
The dynamic of the narrative unfolds in the framework of the programmatic promise
and blessing given to Abraham at the beginning of the cycle: “I will make of you
a great nation, and I will bless you, and make your name great, so that you will be
a blessing” (Gen 12: 1–3); this is then explicitly geared at Isaac at the beginning of
the Aqeda-narrative in Gen 21: 12: not through Ismael but “through Isaac shall your
descendants be named,” as God assures Abraham.
Against the backdrop of this promise the critical conflict in the narrative of Gen 22 is
therefore not between Abraham and Isaac but between a God who promises Abraham
great things in and through Isaac, and the same God, who instructs Abraham to perform
23 Cf. for a more extensive account of the following Dalferth (2008, pp. 456–500).
24 It is remarkable what the story does not narrate: Abraham does not speak to God, Isaac does not protest,
Sarah does not occur at all, Ishmael is not mentioned, Abraham shows no ambiguous feelings towards
Isaac, and Isaac does not comment on anything that goes on. He remains a very shadowy figure in the
narrative and disappears completely from the scene after the ram has been sacrificed and Abraham returns
to Beersheba. All this has again and again given rise to multiple interpretations and fanciful elaborations.
Abraham’s silence was extensively explained, Sarah’s death was depicted as being caused by the shock of
hearing about the intended killing of Isaac, Isaac’s role in the story was extensively enlarged and changed
by presenting him not as a silent sufferer but as a victim who explicitly pleads for his binding and besieges
his father to kill him in order to fulfill God’s will etc. Many of these redactions, updates, and adjustments
go back to pre-Christian times and show how unfixed and versatile the textual history of this narrative was
for a long time. But they have little or no basis in the biblical version of the story: They fill in what readers
experienced as missing because it is not told in the biblical narrative. But if one sticks to the actual narrative
in Gen 22, then one may doubt whether it really is a story about Abraham and Isaac rather than about
Abraham in which also Isaac occurs—just as the Swiss legend of Wilhelm Tell in which Tell is ordered to
shoot an apple off his son’s head with his crossbow is not a story about Tell’s son, or about the relationship
between father and son, but about the Swiss struggle for independence from the Habsburg empire. The figu-
rative inventory of the story and the imaginatively possible relations between the characters in the narrative
are not a sufficient key to a proper understanding of the story. This will only be possible by sticking to the
actual narrative and by interpreting its point in the context of the dynamics of the actual story as told.
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a deed directed at Isaac whose realization would make this promise completely impos-
sible. The tension between God’s promise and its impossibility through God himself
by his order to kill determines the narrative: does God give Israel with one hand while
taking it back with the other? Can one rely on a God who retracts everything promised
any time and without reason? Can one still count on God’s fidelity—can one count on
God at all?
Both the promise and the directive making this promise impossible are attributed
to the same God so that there is no way out by grounding the promise in God and the
questioning of this promise in anyone else but God, as it has been tried by versions of
the Aqeda story in the wake of the prologue of Job.25 Rather, Abraham is placed into
a dilemma, in which there is virtually nothing else for him to say since God seems to
have fallen into a contradiction. To speak with others about God will not lead him any
farther, and to speak to God is impossible because God has become so contradictory
that he can no longer be addressed in a determinative way (“my God”).
Abraham’s action: the trial of God
Where nothing more can be said, life will decide. This conflict cannot be decided by
argument because God has become incomprehensible and inaccessible as a dialogue
partner; the conflict can only be carried out in that Abraham takes the one side of
God’s paradoxical and self-contradictory will at his word and acts upon it to the point
where the question of God takes care of itself or where God himself—so the solution
of the tale—repeals the ambivalence in his Abraham/Israel relationship and owns up
to his promises. In brief, it is not Abraham who is put to the test by God, but rather
Abraham, who no longer speaks but acts, puts God to the test. Abraham virtually com-
pels God either to take leave from his people as God or to prove himself as God and
to stand by his promises to his people. He dares to challenge God and he wins—not
only clarity (this he would have won even in the case of a negative outcome of the
trial) but certainty that God stands by his promises.
Why is this testing of God—this carrying out of the conflict in Israel’s relationship
to God and understanding of God—theologically depicted through the very story of
Abraham’s offering of his beloved son? Because it lends itself excellently to demon-
strating the conflict in Abraham’s/Israel’s relationship to and trust in God. The decisive
point of the story is not that Abraham should kill his beloved son but that his beloved
son is the only reliable pledge of God’s promise. The existentially extreme situation in
which Israel in exile finds itself vis-a-vis God is made apparent here in that Abraham
is prepared, upon God’s order, to destroy the very pledge of God’s promise: either this
is the end of all dealings of Israel with God or God must surrender his ambivalence
with respect to Israel.
It is precisely for the depiction of this trial of God that the ancient cult legend
regarding the replacement of child sacrifice by animal sacrifice is taken up and told
anew with the protagonists God, Abraham and Isaac. The story does not serve to make
25 Cf. the versions of the story that were found in Qumran in which prince Mastemah and his evil angels
machinate against Abraham before God (4Q225 2 i and ii; 4QPs-Juba 2 i 7-14, 2 ii 1-14).
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claims about the arbitrary will of God, or about the violence intrinsic even to the
most moral religion, or about the religious monstrosity of a blind faith in God who
demands obedience all the way to the moral degradation of the believer. It is not about
any of this, but only about disambiguating a God who in his unpredictable turning to
and turning away is experienced as a pure paradox and hence cannot serve as giving
direction to one’s life.26 One cannot trust such a God. He becomes superfluous as a
point of reference or orientation.
The narrative clarification in Gen 22 results in a more precise understanding of God
and of Israel’s relationship to God. God is not to be found invariably in everything,
but only in certain experiences, and only certain ways of life and action correspond
to God’s will while others do not. This is the basic insight both of Jewish ethics as
culminating in the Torah and of Christian ethics as concentrated in the command-
ment of love: one can now say with certainty that nothing can be attributed to God
or God’s will that contradicts God’s promises or that would bring human beings in
contradiction to God’s will as expressed in his promises.
This is not self-evident, for why should a promise given freely not also be taken back
freely? Exactly this possibility is excluded in the Aqeda-story, in that its realization
is depicted as resulting in a self-contradiction and self-repeal of God and is thereby
declared a factual impossibility. God’s promises are certain, even if one cannot fathom
from one’s own experiences how one stands with God. God is trustworthy, even if the
evidence of one’s life is ambiguous—this is how one could summarize the practical
point of this story. If God can no longer be distinguished from his promises nor be
thought of as an arbitrary free will completely independent of them, then he can also
no longer be utilized for everything indiscriminately but only for certain things and in
specific respects.
Seen in this way, Gen 22 recounts by way of an old legend (the replacement of child
sacrifice with animal sacrifice) a new and extremely consequential story for the reli-
gious life and thought of Israel: the story of ascertaining the trustworthiness of God’s
promises through Abraham’s trial of God. By taking God, whom Israel no longer
understands, at his word and by acting out what cannot be argued out, Abraham cre-
ates a decisive situation in which God proves himself to be either entirely superfluous
or the one who cannot revoke his promises without self-contradiction that amounts
to self-annihilation. There is nothing impossible about revoking a promise as such,
and the evidence of Israel’s experience seemed to show that this had indeed happened
in the case of God. Contrary to this Gen 22 affirms that God strictly excludes any
revocation of his promises as impossible for himself so that human experience cannot
serve as a reliable judge in matters of faith: either there is no God, or God’s promises
cannot be revoked even by God himself. Tertium non datur —so the story emphasizes.
With the conclusion of Abraham’s God-experiment, the promise is reliably
inscribed into the very idea of God, i.e., there is no longer any way to distinguish
26 This is clearly expressed in the twin parables of BerR 56,11 which interpret Gen 22:15–16. It is Abra-
ham whose strength of faith saves God from getting involved in a deadly self-contradiction by undoing
himself his own promise. And in the second parable it is again Abraham who makes God swear never to do
something like this again. By divine oath God is now tied to his promise and hence forthwith a God who
can be trusted. Cf. Thoma and Lauer (1991, pp. 308–310).
123
Int J Philos Relig (2010) 68:77–94 89
God meaningfully from what he has promised Israel. God can no longer be played
off against his promises. Whoever says “God,” speaks of the one who stands by his
promises.
The life-experiment of Jesus: the discovery of God’s love
The same can be said in the Christian case. Christian faith in God is intrinsically
related to the life, teaching, suffering, and death of Jesus. However, that God’s will for
humankind is manifested in Jesus is not readily apparent. According to the gospels,
Jesus directly connected the beginning of God’s benevolent kingdom with his own
person (Mt 11:5f) in his teachings and acts of healing, and during his brief active life
he was able to convince a few disciples of this. But at the end his life he was not even
sure of this connection himself. According to the oldest gospels Mark and Matthew,
Jesus died on the cross with a cry—a cry of God-forsakenness: “My God, my God,
why have you forsaken me?” (Mk, 15:34; Mt 27:47) The citation from Ps 22 is not
a disguised sign of hope in God, but rather an expression of despair. It is a lamenta-
tion and an accusation of someone who finds himself unjustly and against all fairness
abandoned by God, whom God has not stood by or assisted in his need, who dies
deserted by God and the world—without the trust in God that Luke has him articulate
(Lk 23:46) and without the confidence that John gives him for having fulfilled God’s
duty (John 19:30).
God’s silence: Jesus’ unsuccessful test of God
According to the gospel of Mark, God himself has become the reason for Jesus’ despair
on the cross. There is no question that God is still the one to whom Jesus addresses
his lament. He is not plagued by modernity’s intellectual doubt about God’s existence,
but by the practical despair about the seclusion and withdrawal of God who fails to
act in the hour of his greatest need. God, who had been the most intimate center of his
life (“my father”), offers him neither help nor direction.
This contradicts everything the New Testament tells us about Jesus’ gospel message
of the imminent coming of God’s kingdom that he promulgated through his teachings,
life, parabolic actions and narratives.27 God’s time of salvation is at hand and ends the
suffering of all those who change their lives and believe in the gospel (Mk 1:15). For
all we know Jesus lived in the conviction that through his acting and teaching he was
actually enacting God’s will. This is the very reason why God’s silence on the cross is
for Jesus a breaking of his word, unjust and merciless towards the very one who has
placed all of his hope in God’s compassion and righteousness; a willful default of God
to render assistance to one of his creatures; the failure of a father to be true to his son;
a complete contradiction to everything he had preached and acted out as God’s good
will for humankind in the parables of the prodigal son, of the good Samaritan, in the
healing of the sick, and in the symbolic actions of forgiving of sins. It seems that on
27 Stanton (2004, Chap. 1) grounds even the term ‘gospel’ by reference to Jes 61, Lk 4 and the Q-passage
Lk 7:19–13 resp. Mt 11:2–6 in Jesus’ own teaching.
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the cross, the God proclaimed by Jesus has become untrue to himself, and it is in this
despair, according to the oldest testimony of the gospels, that Jesus died.
The story of Abraham in Gen 22 and the story of Jesus in Mark’s gospel thus both
present a God-experiment by their respective protagonists that concerns God’s trust-
worthiness and the reliability of his promises. But both do so with a strikingly different
narrative trajectory and outcome. In the Aqeda-story Abraham tests God when he no
longer knows, as a result of God’s contradictory promises and directions, what his
relationship to God is. In the end, God has proven himself to be inseparable from his
promises because he has committed himself to them: God is the God of promises, and
because God can and will not be otherwise, his promises for Israel are reliable even
where this isn’t recognizable in a real-life circumstance. Jesus, on the other hand,
dedicated his entire “career” to God’s promise and counted on his faithfulness and
support all the way to the cross, but in the end he was disappointed by God and died
in despair.
On a narrative level the first story ends positively, the second negatively. The nar-
rative logic of the Aqeda-story focuses on the repeal of God’s ambivalence, and does
so for Abraham himself, who through his action brings God into a situation in which
he must decide for or against himself and is thus forced to commit himself to what
he wants to be as God for Israel: the question about God’s godhead is decided in the
narrative of the story for Abraham himself and is also presented as such. In Mark’s
gospel, however, the ambivalence is driven to the extreme of presenting Jesus on the
cross as dying convinced of having been deserted by God and this is not corrected or
put straight for Jesus himself within the narrative. The narrative logic of the gospel
lets Jesus end on the cross in contradistinction to everything that is, according to Mark
1:15, contained in the gospel and unfolded in the gospel narrative of Jesus’ life and
activity. The one story results hence in a clarified idea of God, the other leads to the
point where the meaning of term “God” has become completely unclear. While the
narrative trajectory in the Abraham story leads from uncertainty to certainty about
God, the narrative trajectory of the gospel narrative leads from the certainty about
God to the loss of God.
The third view: autobiographical and biographical perspective
But this is only the case if one reads these stories in isolation and ignores their wider
contexts. In the story of Abraham, everything that needs to be said is said in the story.
In Mark’s story of Jesus, on the other hand, a dramatic conflict is built up between
Jesus’ understanding of God as proclaimed in the gospel and the loss of God by the
proclaimer of that gospel as he dies on the cross. This conflict is not resolved in the
gospel narrative of his life, but—the account of the empty grave (Mk 16:1–8) and the
secondary ending of Mark (Mk 16:9–20) substantiate this—finds resolution only in
the life of those to whom this story is told and who experience the crucified as the
resurrected one. The darkness into which the understanding of God falls on the cross
is lifted and repealed not in the life story of Jesus, and therefore for Jesus himself, but
in the life story of those who believe in him as Christ, and therefore for others. The
other gospels corroborate this too in that they do not conclude the story of Jesus’ life
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experiment with the cross but continue it with their accounts of the Easter discovery
of his resurrection, the appearances of the resurrected one, and his ascension to God in
heaven. God’s saving activity that is seen in this story and confessed by recounting it
is not presented as occurring in the life, suffering, and death of Jesus but rather in the
lives of those who believe in him as Christ. The theological point of the gospel story
of Jesus does not lie in his story itself but in the life of those who recognize him as
Christ, and only by including this point of view of others in the story of Jesus himself
can his story be properly represented.
If we follow the logic of Mark’s gospel, then from the autobiographical perspective
of Jesus himself his life story with God ends with his cry of God’s abandonment. It
is only with the biographical perspective of others on the Jesus’ story that it becomes
apparent that this is not the whole story or the last word about God and God’s god-
head. For them, the ambivalence of God on the cross is undone and overcome by
using Jesus’ own understanding of God as loving father as a key to making sense of
his whole story, including his death on the cross. To do so, they had to inscribe the
inscrutable aporia between Jesus’ promulgation of God and the end of his life as a
dialectic into the very idea of God, thereby creating a Christian understanding of God
that in significant ways goes beyond Jesus’ own understanding.
God as love: from Jesus’ understanding to a Christian understanding of God
As a result, certain traits of Jesus’ idea of God are intensified and deepened while new
ones are added. Thus, it is God alone who lifts the ambivalence, which made Jesus
despair on the cross, by moving people through the workings of the spirit to believe in
Jesus as Christ, i.e. as the ultimate disclosure of God’s salvific will for all humankind.
For precisely this reason the reference to Jesus’ story culminating on the cross, told
as his life experiment with God, is inscribed as an indelible character into the Chris-
tian understanding of God. This happens discursively in the narrative unfolding of the
metaphors of Jesus’ resurrection, his ascension to heaven and his seat on God’s right
side, all of which establish in their own way that God is no longer to be understood
apart from the life story of Jesus and the life story of those who believe and profess
that Jesus is the Christ.
In the trajectory of Mark’s gospel, the dramatic, theological point of the life exper-
iment of Jesus is not to be found in his own story but in the life story of those who
proclaim him to be Christ: They state the truth about his life (in a biographical perspec-
tive) that is inaccessible to Jesus himself from within his life (in an autobiographical
perspective); and this truth is the creative presence of God’s love even where it isn’t
perceived and experienced by the ones to whom God is present but only by others.
The life story of Jesus is thus internally related to the life story of Christians, and vice
versa (and there is nobody who could not in principle become a Christian): Just as the
truth of their lives cannot be expressed without reference to Jesus, so the truth of his
life cannot be stated without referring to their lives; and in each case the reference is
mediated through ‘the third’ that is common to both of them: the presence of God’s
creative love in their lives.
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The internal connection between the life story of Jesus and the life stories of Chris-
tians thus becomes manifest in the continuous and ongoing determination of the idea
of God in a process which Christians attribute not to their own power of interpretation
but to the eye-opening working of the spirit of God. It runs, with many ups and downs,
from the Jewish through the Jesusian to the Christian understanding of God.28 Thus
what became the Christian idea of God originated with the Jewish tradition, became
intensified in Jesus, ran into a decisive crisis at the cross, was continuously deepened
and revised in the Christian interpretation of this crises in the light of Jesus’ own
understanding of God as loving father, became critically marked off against the myth-
ological, natural and political theologies of the ancient world in a way that resulted in
the Trinitarian account of God, and has since been a continual challenge to reconfigure
God not as a past reality but as a present and creative actuality.
The creative power of love
The condensation of this complex process in the Christian determination of God as
love creates the idea of a creative, unlimited, and unselfish love that establishes in
Israel’s understanding of God and in Jesus’ understanding of God as father the very
precondition for recognizing a love to be at work in Jesus’ life and death that creates
new life out of suffering and death. It is not God who sacrifices Jesus on the cross,
nor does Jesus sacrifice himself, but out of love for those to whom he proclaims the
advent of God’s benevolent reign he goes all the way to his death on the cross.
Precisely this life of unconditional love that leads to Jesus’ death on the cross proves
for Christians to be an irreversible sign that here God discloses himself as unselfish,
unconditional love. This is why they confess Jesus as God’s love incarnate, and God’s
love as his creative presence that creates good out of evil and new possibilities for
his creatures even in death. Even where they themselves cannot realize this any more,
28 All of them are given only in a plural form. This is also true of Jesus’ understanding of God, which
for us is accessible only through the different versions of the different gospels. But even so it is clear that
Jesus proclaimed not a new God but rather concentrated, emphasized and intensified the understanding of
God in the prophetic and theological traditions of Israel in the light of his own experience, faith, and hope.
The outcome was Jesus’ distinctive understanding of God as benevolent heavenly father whose reign of
peace is imminent. This understanding of God, which Jesus lived and proclaimed, ran into a decisive crisis
at the cross which could have been the end of Jesus’ intensification of the theological traditions of Israel.
But in fact the reverse took place in that Jesus’ understanding of God, which appeared to have come to
an end at the cross, became the hermeneutical key and theological frame for understanding this very end.
By understanding the cross of Jesus in the light of Jesus’ own teaching about God as God’s resurrection
of the crucified one, and by understanding this understanding of the cross not as their own interpretation
but as the result of the eye-opening work of God’s spirit, the followers of Jesus learned to cope with the
crises of Jesus’ understanding of God at the cross by understanding this crisis precisely in terms of Jesus’
understanding of God, thereby deepening it into the Christian understanding of God. Thus, just as Jesus
intensified Israel’s understanding of God by interpreting his own life in and through it, and vice versa, so
the Christians intensified Jesus’ understanding of God by interpreting Jesus’ death on the cross as well as
their own experiences of the presence of his spirit in terms of Jesus’ understanding of God. They confessed
the resurrection of the crucified one by the very God whom Jesus had proclaimed; they elaborated this
confession in the light of their own experiences of the spirit and in critical dialogue with the theologies
and philosophies of their time; and they thus intensified and deepened Jesus’ understanding of God into the
Christian doctrine of the trinity. Cf. Dalferth (1994a; 1998, 379–409).
123
Int J Philos Relig (2010) 68:77–94 93
others will. This gives a counterfactual ring to the Christian confession of God’s crea-
tive love. But precisely this sets free the creative dynamics of Christian life. For on the
one hand, God’s love experiences and suffers the suffering and dying of his creatures
as his own passion, as the cross discloses. On the other, this divine passion transforms
the suffering of others into the determination of God’s own life to create new life out
of this suffering, as is shown in the resurrection.
And as with Jesus, so with all others. Evil suffered is thereby not abolished or
revoked, but overcome in such a way that something new and good comes out of it.
This is the creative power of love. Sacrifice terminates violence through other vio-
lence, and self-sacrifice violence against others through violence against oneself; but
this merely replaces one evil by another. The passion of divine love, on the other hand,
does not overcome evil with evil but with good, by determining itself through its love
for others to create new life out of suffering and death, thus giving the dead a future
and the hopeless hope. Neither sacrifice nor self-sacrifice can do that. For the schism
between old and new, between death and life cannot be bridged through violence, nor
can it be bridged through violence against violence or sacrifice against sacrifice, but
only through love that for no reason whatsoever creates inexhaustibly new life out of
evil, destruction, and death.
“Is a religion imaginable without sacrifice …?” asked Derrida. My answer is:
Indeed, and it better should if religions are not to be taken merely as manifestations
of human misery and despair but rather as rich and creative expressions of human
fulfillment and hope for a human life at its best.
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